ANALYZING THE DISCURSIVE PLACE OF “REVOLTED” SUBJECTS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY DISCOURSES

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ABSTRACT. The aim of this article is to analyze the construction of the ideological discursive place of the subjects revolted from the Challenging of the Opposition Disorder and of the Conduct Disorder, in the descriptions nosological description present in scientific articles and in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the mental Disorders – DSM-IV. From the Analysis of the Lacanian Discourse, we understand the desire of revolt how intrinsic to the struggles for the social transformation, and we make a list of the fields of the Psychology and Psychiatry as discursive formations that can be to service of the nulification of this desire, from the above-mentioned diagnoses. The methodology of this work is of documental analysis. The analysis of the data presents to us what this ideological place structures from the next categories, knowing: well-adjusted subject, productive subject; obedient subject and friendly subject. From this analysis we can conclude that there is a ‘psicopatologization’ of ‘revolted’ subjects – those who, in some way, turn against the status quo operandi.

Keywords: Discourse analysis; Lacan, Jacques; antisocial behavior.

O LUGAR DISCURSIVO IDEOLÓGICO DO “REVOLTADO” NO DISCURSO DA PSICOLOGIA E PSIQUIATRIA

RESUMO. Este artigo tem como objetivo analisar a construção do lugar discursivo dos sujeitos revoltados a partir do Transtorno Desafiador de Oposição e do Transtorno de Conduta, nas descrições nosológicas presentes em artigos científicos e no Manual Diagnóstico e Estatístico dos Transtornos mentais – DSM-IV. A partir da Análise Lacaniana de Discurso, compreendemos o desejo de revolta como intrínseco às lutas pela transformação social, e relacionamos os campos da Psicologia e Psiquiatria como formações discursivas que podem estar a serviço da anulação desse desejo, deslegitimando ideologicamente a revolta, a partir dos referidos diagnósticos. A metodologia desse trabalho é análise documental. O tratamento dos dados nos apresenta que este lugar ideológico se estrutura a partir das seguintes categorias, a saber: sujeitos adaptados, sujeitos produtivos; sujeitos obedientes e sujeitos amistosos. A partir dessa análise, podemos concluir que há uma ‘psicopatologização’ de sujeitos ‘revoltados’ – aqueles que, de alguma maneira, se indispõem com o status quo operandi.


ANÁLISIS DE LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL LUGAR DISCURSIVO IDEOLÓGICO DEL SUJETO REVOLTOSO EN EL DISCURSO DE LA PSICOLOGÍA Y LA PSIQUIATRÍA

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RESUMEN. Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar la construcción del lugar discursivo ideológico de sujetos rebeldes de trastorno desafiador de oposición y trastorno de la conducta, en las descripciones nosológicas previstas en los artículos científicos y en el Manual Diagnóstico y Estadístico de los Trastornos Mentales - DSM-IV. A partir del análisis lacaniano de discurso, entendemos el deseo de rebelarse como intrínseco a la lucha por el cambio social, y relacionar los campos de la psicología y la psiquiatría como formaciones discursivas que pueden ser de servicio a la anulación de ese deseo, de tales diagnósticos. La metodología de este estudio es un análisis de documentos. El tratamiento de los datos nos muestra que esta posición ideológica se estructura a partir de las siguientes categorías, a saber: los sujetos adaptados, sujetos productivos; sujetos súbditos obedientes y respetuosos. A partir de este análisis se puede concluir que existe una ‘psicopatologización’ de los sujetos ‘revoltosos’ - los que de alguna manera se caen con el modus status quo.

Palabras-clave: Análisis de discurso; Lacan, Jacques; conducta antisocial.

Introduction

This article is part of an end-of-course project in Psychology and is linked to a Study and Research Group, a space for the development of critical researches aimed at analyzing elements about ideology in politics, based on the Lacanian Discourse Analysis. From this perspective, the objective of this article is to analyze the construction of the discursive ideological place of rebels based on Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Conduct Disorder diagnoses, according to nosological descriptions present in scientific articles and in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – DSM-IV.

In this investigation we found the Oppositional Defiant Disorder diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - DSM-IV (APA, 2002). This psychopathology is described as an individual’s oppositional disobedient attitude before rules and references of traditional authority (parents, teachers, bosses, government). Although psychology and psychiatry do not treat directly of the concept ‘revolt’, we see a direct connection between said diagnosis and the desire for revolt, pointed by Kristeva (2000), because both deal with transgression; the psychoanalytical view takes this desire as something necessary for social changes, but the DSM-IV proposes the psycho-pathologization of every relation of social dissatisfaction.

In this sense, if the positions of an individual usually associated with rebellion, opposition, denial, are symptoms of a disease, they end up preventing (with a master signifier of science, the diagnosis) the individual from being able to build new signifiers relating to the break with hierarchy, break with representations, division of powers, and from causing deep political changes in society.

In this way, psychology and psychiatry can play an ideological role from certain perspectives, considering the explicit and implicit ways these discourses comprehend and analyze the suffering of individuals and the way they name it in the social bond. Taking the Lacanian Discourse Analysis as an epistemology included in our method, we show that language is not neutral, and the fields of psychology and psychiatry have historical elements, pointed by Parker (2014), which evidence an ideological bias at the service of a certain operation of the social corpus (hegemonic) and a certain type of subject.

Lacanian Discourse Analysis (LDA): discursive and ideological place

From Lacan’s perspective (1992) when treating the matter of language and understanding how the social bond is structured, it is imperative to consider the primacy of the signifier over the signified; Lacan inverts the signified and signifier formula coined by Saussure.

Using symbols like S1, S2 and a to systematize the insertion of the human being in the linguistic structure, Lacan (1992) stated, through the four discourses, that S1 would be the first signifier, that which precedes the existence of the subject, but whose mark the other makes fall upon the subject; S2 would be the signified or the effect of that first signifier; and a would be precisely the displacement between S1 and S2, given that they are not equal. In this way, it is through the Other that the subject enters the symbolic chain, in which a signifier always refers to another signifier, unfolding towards the infinite.
The Lacanian axiom according to which the unconscious is structured as language points precisely to the idea that the unconscious is ordered by the signifier chain, that is, by the law of language. Because in the unconscious, there is the mark made by S1, arising from the structure of language and from all signifiers that unfold from that first signifier throughout the subject’s life story. This is because, contrarily to what many think, in the reading of psychoanalysis the subject’s story plays an important role in the structure of the unconscious: it is responsible for carrying out a certain regulation of the sliding of the chain of signifiers, allowing a signifier to refer to another signifier which is not any signifier, providing the unconscious with “points de capiton” (quilting points), which are, in the subjective structure, that which unites, even if temporarily, a certain signifier of a certain signified.

For Parker (2013a, p. 55), this Lacanian axiom cannot be restricted to a “Freud + Saussure = Lacan” formula, because the latter becomes reductionist, since Lacan manages to formulate a very original theory of language, but without dispensing with his epistemological bases. The attempt by Parker and many others (Parker & Pavón-Cuellar, 2013) will be propose some kind of originality in Lacan’s theoretical proposal about discourse and its analysis possibilities in the clinic and in the sphere of the sciences. For this reason, they claim that they are not “inventing” a new discourse analysis method, only showing in Lacan’s studies something that is already there, even if in a diffuse way. These authors defend that the LDA becomes only a systematization of that which is already in Freud and Lacan when they proposed themselves to analyze the literature, artworks, and historical events together, obviously, with clinical cases.

Still in this sense, Parker (2013a) proposes, based on a rigorous and careful reading of Lacan’s work, 7 elements that can compose the LDA, which, therefore, could be used to analyze the discourse. In another work, Parker (2013b) highlights how this analysis can be employed in interviews, and Pavón-Cuéllar (2013) will also show how the LDA can be applied to understand the Mexican reality in the face of drug trafficking.

From this perspective, our work is based on the LDA tradition; however, we will adopt a model of data comprehension and analysis proposed by Lara Junior and Jardim (2014)2, which adds to this LDA perspective the concept of ideology, arising from the French tradition of Discourse Analysis (Pêcheux, 1995). The notion of ideology emerges in this context, in which the relationship between symbolic and political establishes, historically, the forms of symbolization and signification in relations of power:

Consequently, the discourse becomes ideological as it makes use of several maneuvers to legitimate the power of a subject or a social group to the detriment of others. Thus, to legitimate the power of a certain group, subjects need to identify themselves with a discourse in which ideology acquires the hierarchic aspect of the social organization to justify the control of one or ones over others. (p. 64)

It seems coherent to place the field of psychology and psychiatry inside an ideological notion because, as pointed by Parker (2013c; 2014) when referring to psychology, we are in a field which was constituted from psychiatric and psychoanalytical knowledge. It is a discursive web of knowledge that entangles in history and in epistemology (Mendéz, 2013). We find, in this sense, two important questions in these fields: the historical relationship of psychology and psychiatry with subjects (and their behaviors), the objects of discipline, and a certain notion of individuality in which this field was built, around an ideal and total subject that justifies this historical relationship (Pêcheux, 1995).

In this sense, when psychology produces a certain individualized notion of subject, we have as a result of this operation the ideological discursive formation, because it takes the subject as an alleged ‘owner of himself’ and autonomous, but does not assume any relationship with history and politics, making him object of the action of hegemonic discourses that dominate and situate people in certain ideological places, which, in turn, imprison the subject and limit his condition, establishing a relation of knowledge and power that oppresses and subjects. As pointed out by Lara Junior and Jardim (2014):

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2 This text is published in Spanish and, therefore, the citations from this reference have been freely translated by the authors.
The ideological place, therefore, imprisons hegemonic discourses, thus turning into natural the various forms of oppression. This place does not allow mobility and transit of subjects to other discursive possibilities. In this place they operate according to the logic of the master's and the learned man's discourse, without power and knowledge. (p. 71-72).

Based on this logic, we understand that the discourse of psychology and psychiatry, from the Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder diagnoses, imposes to the subject (who opposes or questions instituted authorities) a certain place – mentally ill – and does not allow the construction of discursive places where this defiant position becomes a political act that drives social transformations.

Methodological path

In this work we use as data collection strategy the documental analysis, herein understood as scientific articles published in journals, as well as reference works such as the Psychiatry manual (Souza, Kantorski & Villa Luis, 2011).

We also used as research tools Google Scholar and the Health Virtual Library [Biblioteca Virtual em Saúde] (BVS), researching scientific articles whose titles presented the Portuguese variants Transtorno Desafiador de Oposição; Transtorno Opositivo Desafiador, and Transtorno de Oposição Desafiante. We did the same for Conduct Disorder. This choice was made by the way that these disorders were grouped, along with Antisocial Personality Disorder, the most important ones among disruptive disorders.

In both cases we opted for analyzing articles in which the authors are from the fields of Psychology and Psychiatric and who adopted the DSM-IV to found their diagnoses. We do not ignore that during the writing of this work the DSM-V was introduced to the scientific community, but we assume that considering the time when the DSM-IV was valid is better for us to find a broader and diverse discussion on the theme.

In our data analysis we found seven (7) articles which brought in their title the Oppositional Defiant Disorder, and five (5) articles which presented in their title questions concerning the Conduct Disorder, and we also analyzed 10 pages of said edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – DSM-IV –, in the sections describing the Conduct Disorder and the Oppositional Defiant Disorder.

In the psychiatry area we find the following articles which approach the Oppositional Defiant Disorder, namely: Serra-Pinheiro, Schmitz, Mattos and Souza (2004); Grevet et al, 2005; Serra-Pinheiro, Guimarães and Serrano (2005); Mattos, Serra-Pinheiro, Rohde and Pinto (2006); Grevet, Salgado, Zeni and Belmonte-de-Abreu (2007). Addressing this very same disorder, we found in psychology the following articles: Sá, Albuquerque and Simões (2008); Paulo and Rondina (2010). In psychiatry we found the following articles which treat of the Conduct Disorder: Scivoleto (2005); Silva (2011). In psychology we found the following articles: Cruzeiro et al (2008); Nunes and Werlang (2008); Ornelas and Oliveira (2009).

The Oppositional Defiant Disorder, catalogued in the DSM-IV (APA, 2002) under number F91.3 – 313.81, is described as a disorder in which subjects present “a recurrent pattern of developmentally inappropriate levels of negativistic, defiant, disobedient, and hostile behavior toward authority figures” (p. 173), grouped into 8 diagnostic criteria, including loss of patience, arguments with adults, defiance and refusal before rules. The manual points out that this diagnosis is an evolutionary antecedent of the Conduct Disorder.

That last one, under number F91.8 – 312.8 in the DSM-IV (APA, 2002), situates a grouping of repetitive and recurrent patterns of “behavior in which the basic rights of others or major age-appropriate norms are violated” (p. 163). Within a set of 15 diagnostic criteria, we mention physical fights with other people, thefts and break-ins, destruction of others’ properties and other violations of rules.

First, during the reading of the articles, we grouped partial categories, like the profile and characteristics of diagnosed subjects, because we see in the articles an outline of characteristics that compose a subject’s profile, as we will describe next: Characteristics of Subjects diagnosed with
oppositional defiant disorder: Defiant (Mattos et al., 2006); Problem regulating behavior (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2004); Lazy, unmotivated and losers (Grevet et al., 2005); Lack of attention (Paulo & Rondina, 2010); Inferior performance (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2004); Problem learning, slow response of lower quality, difficulty with planning, repetitive answers, lower capacity to name and abstract (Sá et al., 2008); Worse grades (Grevet et al., 2007); Aggressive (Grevet et al., 2007); Hard to calm down (Paulo & Rondina, 2010).

Characteristics of Subjects diagnosed with conduct disorder: Defiant and negativistic about adults, inadequacy, trouble forming bonds, trouble adapting to school (Nunes & Werlang, 2008); Low academic performance (Ornelas & Oliveira, 2009).

We also point some environmental characteristics and causal relations for the diagnosis, which we call the ‘Risk Factors’ partial category, attributed by the authors as signs or determinations for the ‘development’ of the disorder. To do so, we highlight risk factors for subjects with oppositional defiant disorder: Loss of parents, fights, birth of a sibling, abandonment, being the last one to achieve something, violence at school, going to the dentist or hospital, having a remarkable difference (Paulo & Rondina, 2010); Parents who are divorced and/or have disorders, low socioeconomic level (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2004). Risk factors for subjects with conduct disorder: Inadequate maternal and paternal care, living amidst conjugal disputes, aggressive and violent parents, disorders in parents, low socioeconomic level (Ornelas & Oliveira, 2009); Low socioeconomic level, bullying (Cruzeiro et al., 2008).

Another partial strategy created consisted of data presenting behaviors, as a description of some acts and actions by subjects who can be diagnosed with one of the disorders: Behaviors Partial category – oppositional defiant disorder: Acting contrarily to what is expected, failure to accept rules and adapt to environmental changes (Paulo & Rondina, 2010); Academic refusal (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2005); Arguing with adults, refusal before requests and rules, rage, deliberately annoying others, anger, grudge and vengeance (Sá et al., 2008); Defying figures of authority, parents, bosses (Grevet et al., 2007). Behaviors Partial category – conduct disorder: Violation of social norms, break of rules, lack of decency, disobedience at school, aggressive acts, property damages (Nunes & Werlang, 2008); Social isolation (Grevet et al., 2007); Aggressive behaviors and reactions, sedentary lifestyle and academic failure (Cruzeiro et al., 2008).

Lastly, we included aspects related to prognoses, which refer to a future development of comorbidities or, within the nosological perspective, the development of a future diagnosis, as well as of consequences (general factors which the authors of the articles include about the diagnosed subjects) attributed to the life of the subjects. Here is the Prognoses and Consequences partial category – oppositional defiant disorder: Greater likelihood to develop conduct disorder (Serra Pinheiro et al., 2004, Grevet et al., 2007); Evolutionary antecedent of conduct disorder (Sá et al., 2008); Risk of developing antisocial personality disorder; Depression, suicide, problems with drug use and conflict with the law (Mattos et al., 2006). Prognoses and Consequences partial category – conduct disorder: Conduct disorder predicts one’s possibility of developing Antisocial Personality Disorder and/or becoming a criminal (Cruzeiro et al., 2008; Nunes & Werlang, 2008; Grevet et al, 2007); Bad prognosis for adult life, suicide, depression, drug abuse, problems with the law (Nunes & Werlang, 2008).

The systematization of data presented, in the form of partial categories, contributed to the development of the final result, articulated by the formulation and articulation of the concept of ideological place.

Data analysis

In our final analysis, we articulate what has been presented so far about the Lacanian Discourse Analysis present in the scheme found in Lara Junior and Jardim (2014)3 to analyze discourses, more precisely discursive and ideological places. This scheme was preserved from the theoretical point of view, and partially changed and adapted to the reality of data found. From this perspective, we are

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3 We will not treat in greater details of this discourse analysis scheme, because we have decided to show its applicability in the analysis below. For greater details, see the article cited.
calling it an effect of ideological sense, of the production of well-adapted subjects, as an ideological place that nullifies the rebellious subject.

Based on the reading and analysis of the articles which contain the diagnoses of Conduct Disorder and Oppositional Defiant Disorder, we created three categories of analysis, namely: subjects who should obey; subjects who should produce and subjects who should be friendly.

These categories, which derive from a general notion of well-adapted subjects, were created from data analysis, from meaningful aspects presented during the reading of the articles and manuals, as well as during the analysis of partial categories, indicating some discursive formations of sense about these subjects.

**Analysis of category 1: Productive subjects**

We introduce our first category, which aims to enunciate the need for a productive character in subjects embodied in psychiatric and psychological discourses, because if subjects with both disorders researched lack attention (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2004; Paulo & Rondina, 2010); have inferior performance (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2004); learning problems: slow response of lower quality; repetitive answers and lower capacity to name and abstract (Sá et al., 2008); low academic performance (Ornelas & Oliveira, 2009); "worse grades" (Grevet et al., 2007); are sedentary (Cruzeiro et al., 2008) and even "seen as lazy, unmotivated and losers" (Grevet et al., 2005, p. 309) – in these diagnoses we can observe how a certain ideological place for these subjects is being built and legitimated by these scientific discourses, because they suggest certain moral values of a certain society as the regulator of conducts, which in our case we referred to as the capitalist society. We also see that they are fulfilling their role of adapting the subject to the environment, even if that means the affirmation of stereotypes.

Individuals, interpellated as unproductive subjects, under the ideological role of becoming more productive and efficient before the production reality, should be active and willing to succeed, perform well in their production and even leisure actions, be efficient and productive (ideological place).

This demand can be represented, in the present case, by psychologists, psychiatrists looking at subjects from this dogma: in this bias, they interpellate subjects under the productive logic, creating an ideological place of active and dedicated subjects with good performance, ‘positively reinforcing’ adapted responses from this place or excluding incapable subjects. As pointed by Grevet et al. (2005), the public strategy consists of identifying problems, increasing the coverage of treatments and improving the occupational outcome.

Many of the characteristics mentioned in the articles derive from matters of conduct in a school context where categories concerning “skill” and “intelligence” (Parker, 2014, p. 11) are deeply rooted in the notion of individuals and carry an ideological element for subjects interpellated by these notions: from these categories, the only responsible for responding as expected is the subject, who should be productive or encouraged to produce, which defines those more suitable for intellectual production, reinforcing paradigms of a division between manual and intellectual labor (Parker, 2014).

These categories end up justifying the exclusion of subjects who do not fit the skill and intelligence stereotype. According to Parker (2014), this “logic of separation” (p. 122) creates means of removal of those subjects harder to treat, given that schools are increasingly under pressure to achieve goals, and “unruly children are put under greater pressure to behave better” (p. 122), and if they are not excluded, then they are medicalized.

**Obedient subjects**

Here we assume that disobedience is a prerogative for critical contestation and the possibility of deconstructing paradigms, rules and hierarchies, being a fundamental aspect and posture for contemporary politics and social transformation.

Defiant youths with conduct issues are described as subjects who act contrarily to what is expected and do not accept rules (Nunes & Werlang, 2008; Paulo & Rondina, 2010). They break these rules, lie and miss classes without justification (Nunes & Werlang, 2008); they have trouble regulating their behavior (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2004); are defiant (Mattos et al., 2006, APA, 2002); rejects the school
(Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2005); argue with adults, disregard their requests and rules (Sá et al., 2008; Nunes & Werlang, 2008) and challenge authorities, whether parents or bosses (Grevet et al., 2007).

In addition to quiet subjects, there might be others who simply do not adapt, become stubborn and misunderstood, maybe violent and criminals, for not complying with the norms. If these children and youth received in community spaces, in schools, in neighborhood associations (or even by psychologists and doctors to which they are referred), some type of treatment that recognized them as subjects, as well as structural economic and social conditions for them to develop (decent nutrition, housing, education conditions), would this attitude of disobedience be simply an unfounded childishness?

This is an ideological place and, therefore, a place of stagnation and reproduction of regulations established as truths to be followed and consequent nullification of subjects, since the obedient ones should comply with everything, without questions and claims within the social bond. This type of imposition aims to exclude people and keep differences away, subject individuals to exploitation, perpetuate essentialist ideals of family, ethnicities and so many other models.

Certainly, what is called “tantrum” or “headstrongness” goes beyond a behavior and a stance, so we ask ourselves: why do we not reflect on what these youths are defying? What postures and models of authority would they establish instead? What rules could be abolished, recreated, and invented?

The political dimension of an ‘opposition’ attitude escapes the psychological understanding centered on individuals, since the ideal oftentimes is simply to change the behavior (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2004) of these subjects: that is, if they disobey, they should begin to obey.

If these subjects are left only with that (obey), the hegemonic discourse is based on a notion of reproduction of normative ideals, of hierarchical and authoritarian rules, of unequal relations taken as ‘natural’ in the capitalist system, herein represented by psychology and psychiatry contributing to the reproduction of these normative ideals.

It is the normative dimension pointed by Mendéz (2013) and Parker (2013c, 2014) as the regulator of that which is considered historically abnormal in Psychiatry, Psychology. Because those who question the pre-established reality are opposing to the normative model which originates psychological and psychiatric discourses about subjects interpellated as free, autonomous individuals who should live according to what these discourses impose as ideal.

The interpellation of these subjects as ‘disobedient’ has the role of making them submissive and passive before norms, rules and social standards, since the dissatisfaction of these subjects should be nullified rather than put into an enunciation motion, as Quinet (2009) points out about the perspective of nullification of the symptom, which is not ethical in relation to the subject or to that which he wants to say but cannot.

Friendly subjects

We address at this point a certain notion of relativization of violence, on which we disagree. After all, is inequality of conditions and possibilities not a violence that can lead to other types of violence? For instance, political choices of overpriced constructions, wasting public money that could be invested in education, health, or other matters that concern the collectivity, would all this not be an act of violence?

The relativization of violence is what makes us take some things as natural, others not. We call Bertolt Brecht, when the character Macheath from The Threepenny Opera asks: “What is the robbing of a bank compared to the founding of a bank? What is the murder of a man compared to the hiring of a man?” (Brecht, 1992, p. 192 cited in Milreu, 2010).

When bringing Brecht’s radicalism, we are not trying at all to justify it or justify some type of violence. However, his questions illustrate what we mean by relativization of violence and its ideological importance. Oppression and exploitation (something against which rebelling is legitimate, we understand) generates poverty, and the criminalization of the latter is one of the means of its reproduction: it is necessary to consider in the different means of analysis how a country like Brazil was formed: the processes that enslaved black people; migrations; formation of cities; urban reforms; eugenicist and hygienist thoughts that prevailed over the years.
We therefore have subjects interpellated as revolted and violent by psychology and psychiatry discourses, which can compose part of this contradictory and ideological view of violence. Described as aggressive (Grevet et al., 2007; Nunes & Werlang, 2008) and verbally abusive (Nunes & Werlang, 2008); angry, grudging and vengeful (Sá et al., 2008); abusive users or possible abusive users of drugs (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2005; Nunes & Werlang, 2008; Cruzeiro et al., 2008); who have or will have problems with the law (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2005; Grevet et al. 2007; Cruzeiro et al., 2008), it seems that little is left to these subjects when it comes to the future. The possibility of suicide and depression (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2005; Nunes & Werlang, 2008) is also attributed as outcomes of these disorders.

The hegemonic discourse of our society is based on the normativity of hierarchized relations that should be maintained and obeyed and conceptions about violence which blame solely the subjects. The ideological interpellation of subjects as violent may have the role of making them friendly, docile, passive, neutral, and if this behavior is not regulated and normalized they are doomed to have problems with the law, whose consequence is jail. The ideological place herein is that of subjects who should not fight back or question, who should be ‘good’.

Lastly, we have the place of friendly and calm subjects arranged in an ideological place which opposes to rebellious and violent subjects, requiring them to be well-adapted subjects who will not fight back against exploitation and oppression.

We understand that this notion is based on a biased and isolated idea of violence with no connection with the possibility of understanding what the violent act may mean. It interpolates ‘violent subjects’ so they become ‘good’ and, therefore, do not fight back or oppose to the violence that oppression system perpetrate against them, for instance. Those who continue with their ‘bad behaviors’ should be isolated in an attempt of correction through the prison system so they turn their anger into cordiality, serenity, docility.

Ferrari (2006) points out that discourses related to violence are usually found within a quantifiable sphere in an attempt to reduce them to objectivity, “showing it by means of statistics” (p. 50) and, as a consequence, “the meaning of what it carries nothing matters” (p. 50)

Lacan, in Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis (1998), points out that “aggressiveness manifests in an experience which is subjective in its very constitution” (p. 105), and psychoanalysis was constituted in the sphere of the dimension of sense, that is, only the subject can understand the sense and, thus, “all phenomenon of sense involves a subject” (p. 105). The nullification of subjects is quite evident in relation to the quantification of the violence phenomenon.

In the same way, in Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Crimonology (1998), Lacan addresses the need of questions related to transgression, which cannot be conceived outside their sociological dimension, in which anthropological theories evidence the dimension of positive laws in all societies, as well as all types of transgression of these laws, perceived as crime in this social bond.

The importance of this finding, according to the same author, is in the dimension of the act of breaking with the law, of aggressiveness and violence in the social bond, in which the responsibility category aims to include members of a certain society in the relationship with the law and its transgression (it is everyone’s problem), as well as the responsibility of the subject who commits the violent act of transgression: it is about the subject’s malaise about his insertion in the culture (Lacan, 1998).

We then see that the subject has his position ensured, only taking into account the subjective factor implicit in this relation and which, therefore, if we speak of the dimension of violent subjects, which is the characteristic stressed in manuals, little says about the relationship of the subject with his culture; obviously, there are also subjects who transgress the laws and put into action what they cannot say, such as their indignation and suffering for living in a social bond to which they feel they do not belong (or are greatly affected by material inequalities), are excluded.

The conditions of one’s saying are nullified under this ideological interpellation of violent subjects, just as the production conditions of one’s saying, when a hegemonic discourse is taken from a critical analysis of society and processes of cultural insertion. The productive, obedient and friendly subject triad compose the notion of well-adapted subjects in the capitalist social bond, a notion starred by psychology and psychiatry discourses on subjects who should be satisfied with reality, interpellating
them as those responsible for their failures or successes, dispensing with the different possibilities and difficulties found in the social plane to change their real conditions.

**Final considerations**

First, we approached the term ‘antisocial’ shown in the DSM-IV and in the articles studied, as they refer, for us, to the idea that subjects should adapt to the social environment rather than being ‘antisocial’ or rebellious, disobedient. For this reason, the term antisocial may present shifts of meaning, or maybe of signifiers related to what one should not be, should not do, and even to what one should not oppose: the capitalist social system, company norms, rules at work, production pattern, thoughts, that which is instituted, etc.

This association of disorders frequently appears in said materials. The authors constantly state that the Oppositional Defiant Disorder is a risk factor for the Conduct Disorder (Serra-Pinheiro et al, 2004; Sá et al, 2008; Grevet et al, 2007), and the DSM-IV brings it as an evolutionary antecedent of the Conduct Disorder; Mattos et al. (2006), attributing possibilities of prognosis for Antisocial Personality Disorder.

Cases of Conduct disorder as risk factors are presented with greater emphasis in the shifting to Antisocial Personality Disorder (Cruzeiro et al, 2008; Grevet et al, 2007; APA, 2002). Marmorato and Andrade (2011) cite a research which found that 45% of youths with Conduct disorders become antisocial.

Concerning the DSM-IV and the relation of continuity of disorders, we understand that this relation is taken implicitly, because it indicates that the Oppositional Defiant Disorder should be diagnosed in case the Conduct disorder criteria do not apply, with the same being valid for the Antisocial Personality Disorder (as long as the subject is older than 18).

This relation reveals a fatalist notion that psychology and psychiatry discourses place subjects in a direct relationship with the antisocial signifier: maladjusted, excluded, and socially inadequate. As stated by Silva (2011), in one of the articles we found in the selection analyzed:

> These logical relations of exclusion indicate an alleged development of antisocial behaviors in which the gravity of symptoms and their crippling character worsen, indicating a very negative prognosis. It is precisely the predictive validity of these logical relations that matters for researchers, even though there is no consensus as to evolution and intersection between disruptive behavior cases and their different stages throughout life. (p. 170)

Another aspect we could include regarding the general notion of antisocial subject who should adapt is the recurrent attribution of such disorders with problems at school derived from suspension, expulsion and refusal (Serra-Pinheiro et al, 2004; Serra-Pinheiro et al, 2005; Cruzeiro et al., 2008, APA, 2010), due to the importance of education as a fundamental notion for social insertion, considering that the school is one of the most important organized institutional representatives. Only two articles (Nunes & Werlang, 2008; Scivioletto, 2009) carry out a critical reflection on the role of the school, the need to dialogue and come up with improvements together with subjects without solely holding the ‘rebels’ accountable for their problems, reflecting on how to build diversified strategies to deal with disobedience, violence, learning problems.

The authors speak of subjects from low-income families being more frequently diagnosed (Serra-Pinheiro et al, 2004; Cruzeiro et al, 2008; Nunes & Werlang, 2008; Ornelas & Oliveira, 2009, Marmorato & Andrade, 2011), but that sounds clearly ideological, since they do not even bring a critical analysis of the contexts of inequalities in Brazil and the world, merely assuming a fatality for subjects included in this relational association.

In the same way, some authors continue attesting extremely backward norms such as associating disorders with divorced parents and having a stepfather or stepmother (Serra-Pinheiro et al., 2004), being in a context of “conjugal disputes” (Ornelas & Oliveira, 2009, p. 107), and having a family that is too big (APA, 2010), falling into the prerogatives of an alleged notion of normality.
When we do not find this movement concerning the norms of the ideal family composition, the presence of other mental disorders and drug use by parents, as well as incompetence and ignorance on the part of the latter, are considered (Serra-Pinheiro et al, 2004; Ornelas & Oliveira, 2009), or it is said that subjects who have a “remarkable difference” (Paulo & Rondina, 2010, p. 06) may be given the Oppositional Defiant Disorder diagnosis, leaving a critical position before normative discourses (abovementioned, in their relationship with ideals of family, marriage, sexuality, etc.) and the possibility of subjects existing and not being ill outside these norms.

This normative relation is historical in psychological and psychiatric discourses, as pointed by Mendéz (2013) and Parker (2013c, 2014). It is based on the discourse of an alleged knowledge about the life of subjects, about how they should behave in order to ‘live well’, and on a social demand where ‘abnormal’ is that which did not fit the elitist and prejudiced perceptions of scientists, doctors, politicians who have isolated different, poor, crazy subjects.

These discourses cause the imprisonment of subjects in a cause-effect relationship which they cannot leave except by discussing the matter of poverty, family and community relations, of drug use and violence in the relationships of these subjects with culture, that is, their relationship with their exteriority, as well as different related discourses, a point which we did not find in any of the articles.

For Kristeva (2000), one of the lessons Freud left us as inheritance is that...

... happiness only exists at the price of revolt. None of us is satisfied without facing an obstacle, a prohibition, an authority, a law that allows us to evaluate ourselves, as autonomous and free. The revolt which is revealed following the intimate experience of happiness is part of the principle of pleasure. By the way, the normalizing order is far from perfect and generates the excluded: jobless youths, suburban people, the unemployed, foreigners, among so many others. Now, when the excluded ones do not have the revolt culture, when they have to be satisfied with backward ideologies, with concerts and fun activities which are far from meeting the pleasure requirement, they become aggressive (p. 23).

According to that author, the term revolt appears in Freud already in Totem and Taboo, in which revolted children kill their father, who enjoyed all perks of the primitive group and did as he pleased concerning food, women, based on his wills.

This act, allied to the moment when the children shared the dead father’s flesh, gave them an ambiguous feeling: they identified themselves with their father’s qualities and that gave them a sensation of regret; for this reason, they created an image that represented their ancestor, immortalizing and sublimating this identification with something they once feared. Ultimately, the father’s power was diluted among the members, generating greater freedom among them, establishing a social bond based on the desire for inclusion and sharing (Kristeva, 2000).

We therefore see that this revolt is an act of disobedience, opposition to a social statute that has been pre-determined to subjects, which generates different submissions and authoritarian positions against subjects. This act ensures the subject a sharing of desires and powers in which they identify themselves: an ‘antisocial’ character that aims at a greater desire for the ‘social’, for the construction of a collectivity. Stances related to disobedience, challenging authorities, opposition, are pronouncedly important so that subjects have conditions to revolt, and this revolt should not be delegitimized.

The possibility of subjects taking a stand against what oppresses them, of facing their fears and longings, of voicing the absurd in knowing the rules without questioning their arbitrariness, is materialized through a desire for revolt. And this desire seems, for us, ideologically erased by psychiatric and psychological discourses.

References


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